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Abstract. This paper provides evidence of a feature of Hard-Disk Drives
(HDDs), that we call File System Genome. Such a feature is originated by
the areas where (on the HDD) the file blocks are placed by the operating
system during the installation procedure. It appears from our study that
the File System Genome is a distinctive and unique feature of each indi-
vidual HDD. In particular, our extensive set of experiments shows that
the installation of the same operating system on two identical hardware
configurations generates two different File System Genomes. Further, the
application of sound information theory tools, such as min entropy, show
that the differences between two File System Genome are considerably
relevant. The results provided in this paper constitute the scientific basis
for a number of applications in various fields of information technology,
such as forensic identification and security. Finally, this work also paves
the way for the application of the highlighted technique to other classes
of mass-storage devices (e.g. SSDs, Flash memories).
1 Introduction
This paper reports evidence of an apparently surprising phenomenon that oc-
curs in storage devices. In particular, this paper takes into consideration com-
puter systems that are perfectly identical both from the hardware point of view
(storage devices, motherboard, CPU, RAM, etc..) and software point of view
(operating system and applications), and shows that the locations occupied by
the file’s blocks differ greatly between any two storage devices of such identical
computer systems. Such a distribution of file blocks has an entropy even greater
if one analyses different computer system in terms of hardware and software. In
other words, let us assume that we install on a computer C a given operating
system, and let P be the set of locations occupied by the file blocks at the end of
this operating system installation. After formatting the storage device and hav-
ing installed the same operating system on the same computer C, we observed
that the new set of locations P ′ occupied by the file blocks at the end of the
installation process significantly differs from P . The complete set of the locations
of the file blocks on a given storage device are called in this paper File System
Genome (FSG). It appears from our study that the File System Genome is a
distinctive and unique feature of each individual storage device.
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The following sections discuss the underlying physical and logical phenomenons
originating this feature, and present an extensive experimental campaign to sup-
port our observations. In particular, these first time measured pieces of evidence
have been analyzed in a rigorous way by using information theory techniques. In
particular, our results demonstrate that the installation of the same operating
system software on two identical hardware configurations generate two signifi-
cantly different FSG.
The concept of FSG seems to be applicable to many fields of computer sci-
ence,which include for example Forensic Identification. The Forensic Identifi-
cation of electronic devices is the ability to identify model, configuration, and
other characteristics of an electronic device in a court case. The characteristics
that allow the unique identification of a device are called device signatures. Such
an ability provides a valuable aid for law enforcement and intelligence agencies,
especially in the presence of illicit activities. In general, there are many scenar-
ios in which the Forensic Identification can be decisive. For example, it may be
used to confirm whether digital photographs have been acquired using a specific
camera [3], where the noise characteristics in a digital image is used as camera’s
signature; or it may be useful to confirm that a document has been printed out
using a specific printer [8]. Similarly, the concept of FSG can be used to develop
a scheme to verify the ownership of a particular storage device. For example,
consider the following scenario: suppose that the IT security officer of an orga-
nization has to verify that a lost storage device, just found again, belongs to the
organization. The aim of the adversary is to forge the content of a storage device
in such a way that it is considered as belonging to the organization, so as to have
it introduced in the IT infrastructure of the opponent—for instance, this device
carrying a stuxnet-like worm. Assume that the security officer has computed pre-
viously the FSG on the read-only files of his storage device, keeping it in a safe
place. If the FSG of the found storage device corresponds with the one the IT
security officer had guarded, then he can demonstrate the property of the item.
Note that since the IT security officer computes the FSG only on read-only files,
the FSG remains valid and unchanged, even if the IT security officer modifies the
storage device after calculating the FSG. A simple solution based on computing
the hash of the entire storage device is unsatisfactory because two storage de-
vices with the same data have the same hash, while they have different FSG, as
it will be shown in the following. In addition, FSG can be a useful building block
for authentication protocols as well. Consider for instance the following scenario:
the security policies of a Government Organization prevents the employees from
bringing electronic devices belonging to the organization (namely internal de-
vices) outside the organization building. At the same time, such security policies
allow an employee to bring his own electronic devices (namely external devices),
such as laptop or smart phones, inside the organization’s building. The Gov-
ernment Organization can leverage FSG to reliably distinguish between internal
and external devices.
Contributions Our results evidence a distinctive and unique feature of each
individual storage devices, called File System Genome (FSG). In particular, the
main contributions of this paper are:
1. We put forward the definition of FSG, which can be used to distinguish two
devices even if they use the same configurations (hardware and software)
and store the same data. To the best of our knowledge, this feature has not
been considered before.
2. We devise an algorithm to map the FSG compliant with ext4, one of the
most spread file systems used in both server and client workstations and we
collect a huge set of real installations of the Debian GNU/Linux (more than
12, 000 installations of such operating system).
3. We evaluate the File System Genome by investigating the entropy and min-
entropy values, that characterize the diversity of the installations as stochas-
tic process
Our results prove that an host can be reliably identified based on the File
System Genome, showing a straightforward application to the forensics identi-
fication domain. Further, we believe that the File System Genome can be used
as a building block for authentication protocols and, in general, to enforce other
security properties.
Roadmap The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the causes of the
non-determinism of the file block locations; it investigates the relevant aspects
in the architecture of a modern operating systems focusing on the Linux kernel.
Section 3 describes the environment and testbed in which our experiments have
been performed and the evaluations of the proposed fingerprinting technique.
Section 4 surveys related work, while Section 5 concludes the paper outlining
future directions.
2 The non-determinism of the file block locations
This section investigates the software and hardware components that are in-
volved in the choice of the block addresses selected during a write operation.
Due to the unpredictable interleaving of these components, the overall result is
the introduction of a certain level of randomness in file allocation, that originates
the FSG diversity we measured in our experiments. This section also provides
a description of the main features of the file system we based our experiments
upon, and survey how the related structures influence the FSG.
In this paper we focus on Hard Disk Drives (HDDs): a type of storage device
that stores data on rotating magnetic disks. The most important components of
HDDs are: the mechanical arm, the head and the disk. These components are
involved during every write operation; to perform a write, the arm places the
head in the right position; then, the head writes the data on the rotating disk.
The arms placements is the most time consuming operation, referred as seek
time.
To reduce the seek time it is convenient to limit the movements of the arms.
One of the kernel components that is involved in the seek-time optimization
is the File Systems (FS ). Indeed, whenever a user-space process invokes the
write() system call, the data are copied in kernel space, splitted into blocks and
prepared for the physical write [4]. When a write() system call returns, data are
just placed in a write cache that resides in RAM. As such, there are no block
locations that are marked as occupied when the write() system call returns to
the caller. Through this mechanism, multiple physical write requests can be
aggregated, reducing the mean seek time. The physical write on the storage
device is performed by the kernel in predetermined time intervals through a
specific operation called sync. The choice of the locations where the blocks has
to be placed is performed by the sync operation, on the basis of the free blocks
and the blocks present in the write cache.
Based on these observations, we define the File System Genome as the list
of block locations used by a set of files.
Definition 1 (File System Genome (FSG)). Let F be a File System hierar-
chy; The File System Genome, GF, is a matrix where each row i represents the
list of locations used to store the data blocks of the file fi belonging to F.
The surprising results exposed in this paper highlight that the File System
Genome presents a large amount of randomness may represent a distinctive
and unique feature of each individual storage device.
In order to explain this phenomenon, consider the installer of a generic oper-
ating system. In Figure 1, during the installation process several files are written
to the disk. We take as a reference a generic file f , which is composed by four
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Fig. 1. The writings of file f in two independent installations. The blocks in the write
queue influence the choices of the physical locations.
blocks (b1, b2, b3, b4). When the sync is invoked by the kernel, a different set of
blocks is present within the write cache of the two installations. During instal-
lation 1 only b1 and b2 are in the write cache at the time of sync. In this case,
the best locations (i.e. the locations that minimize the seek time) are all the
positions with at least two consecutive free blocks, that is the locations l1, l2.
Whereas, during installation 2, b1, b2 and b3 are in the write cache at the time
of the sync. In this case there is only one possible solution: l8, l9, l10. From this
point onwards, the locations selected for the subsequent physical writes during
installation 1 diverge from the one selected by the installation 2. Please note,
when the installer invokes the write system call for f , the lists of free and occu-
pied blocks are identical for the two installations, nevertheless that the described
operating system optimization mechanisms can cause significative variations in
the choices of the block locations. Further, Figure 1 describes only one example
whereas there are many possible cases that depend on several factors such as
the interleaving of the processes.
In two consecutive operating system installations, a different set of blocks can
be present in the write cache for the same file. In addition, if we consider that
the execution of the write and the sync operations are totally asynchronous and
can have unpredictable interleavings, one can conclude that the overall effect is
a non-determinism in the choice of the block location during each installation.
Also, we have assumed for simplicity in Figure 1 that the sync operations occur
at the same time during two different installations, however in reality such sync
operations are unrelated, hence the degree of non-determinism is even higher as
will be demonstrated in the following.
The following subsection provides a more detailed description of the unpre-
dictable interleaving of FS operations in the case of the Linux kernel.
2.1 Linux I/O architecture for storage devices
Linux supports multiple file system types through a multi-tiered software ar-
chitecture. In this section, we describe the kernel components involved during
an I/O operations, focusing on the most widespread file system in the Linux
environment: the Extended File System version 4 (ext4 ).
Virtual File System The Virtual File System (VFS) is an intermediate layer
between the file system modules (e.g. ext4 ) and the kernel system calls. The first
advantage of using the VFS is that different file systems can be managed in a
similar way by the kernel. The interfaces exposed by the VFS are wrappers, that
forward a function to the FS specific implementation. The abstraction provided
by the VFS allows a user-level developer to invoke the I/O system calls (e.g.
read() and write()) without worrying about the specific underlying FS . The
VFS implements a common file model and all the FS drivers must comply with
it.
The VFS splits large I/O requests into chunks of fixed-size and forces single-block
allocations without providing any information about the pending operations
on that file to the FS implementation. Due to a different interleaving of the
processes, the number of blocks that has been forwarded to the lower layers at
the sync time, can vary across different execution of the installation procedure.
As such, the VFS influences which blocks are marked as free and which blocks
are present in the write cache when the kernel invokes the sync operation.
The Ext4 file system Ext4 inherits several features from its previous versions;
for this reason in the following we provide an overview of ext2 and ext3.
Ext2 and ext3 introduced several new features to improve the performance
and the resilience to disk failures of the FS. In order to limit the internal fragmen-
tation, they organize the blocks into groups. Each group covers adjacent tracks
and includes both data and meta-information. In details, each block group con-
tains: i) a copy of the file system’s superblock ; ii) a group descriptors; iii) the
block group bitmap, namely a structure that takes into account the free blocks
in the group; iv) the inode data structures (bitmap and table); and, v) the data
blocks. The ext2 and ext3 file systems preallocate exceeding data blocks to reg-
ular files before they are actually used. Such a strategy reduces fragmentation
when the file size increases, since the data are allocated in adjacent location.
Ext4 is the last version of the family [9]. Ext4 supports larger file and larger
partitions with respect to the previous versions, and introduces several new
features. However, for the sake of this work, we focus on two of these features: i)
the delayed allocation; and, ii) the multiple allocation. Delayed allocation, defers
block allocations from the time of the write system calls to the time of sync.
This feature brings several advantages: it increases the opportunity to combine
many block allocation requests into a single request reducing fragmentation and
saving CPU cycles; further, it avoids unnecessary block allocation for short-
lived files. At the time of the write system call, ext4 estimates only the required
number of blocks to reserve (marking it with the BH DELAY flag) checking
that enough free blocks are available in the file system to satisfy the write.
Later, when the sync operation starts, all the dirty blocks (i.e. marked as BH -
DELAY) are processed and clustered according to the logical locality that is
established by the multiple allocation component. This component attempts to
accommodate the requirements of both large and small files; in details, for small
files ext4 uses a per-CPU locality policy which is shared by all allocations under
the same CPU; this strategy allows to keep small files close to each other. In
contrast, the allocation request of large files is performed using a per-file locality
policy; as such, ext4 maintains an in-memory preallocation range for each file,
and uses that to solve the fragmentation issues caused by concurrent allocations.
With respect to the ext3 block allocation policy (single-block allocation), ext4
provides better performance for both small and large files [9]. These features of
ext4 may contribute to increment the FS diversity; on the one hand, the per-
CPU locality binds a write operation to the scheduling order, that cannot be
considered deterministic. On the other hand, for two independent installations,
a different set of blocks may be present in the write cache for the same file. Such
diverse settings could lead to different allocation decisions; in particular, if only
few blocks of a large file are present in the write cache, at the time of the sync,
then the multiple allocation could wrongly exchange a large file for a small one.
Due to the differences in the locality policies between large and small files, in
ext4 this scenario cause differences in the the block locations, influencing the
FSG.
Ext4 introduced several improvements in the block group management (e.g.
flex bg [9]), however, as in the previous versions, also in ext4 the top level direc-
tories are always spread in different groups. In the other cases, ext4 behaves as
follows: if the new inode is a directory, then a forward search is made for a block
group with both free space and a low directory-to-inode ratio; if that fails, then
of a random group is returned. For other inodes, a forward search is performed
from the parent directory’s block group to find a free inode (for more details
please refer to the file fs/ext4/ialloc.c in the version 3.2.39 of the linux sources).
Under these circumstances, during the installation procedure, the choices of the
groups of the first files is demanded to a random function. Further, due to the
delayed allocation and multiple allocation, also if the same block group is chosen
in two different installations, there are differences in the obtained FSG.
2.2 Hardware faults
This subsection describes how the status of an HDD may influence the FSG.
Some physical blocks of an HDD can be marked as damaged by the widely
used Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology system (SMART) 3.
The SMART controller provides a way to measure drives’ characteristics at
the firmware layer, by collecting the functional statistics of the HDD, e.g. track-
seek retries, read errors, write faults, reallocated sectors, head fly height, and
environmental temperature. Once the SMART recognizes an high error rate for
some physical blocks, that blocks are marked as unusable.
Many factors can causes damages to an HDD. Damaged blocks, generated
by manufacturing errors, are already present in the devices when they leaves the
factory. In such case, the HDD owner will never uses the bad blocks, in some
circumstances it may modify the disk’s geometry. More in general, an HDD can
receive shocks (physical or electrical) and some blocks may be damaged. An HDD
can also have one or more bad blocks. These blocks are handled in a different
way by the SMART. The disk, at first, try to recover the information; next, it
moves the recovered information to one or more spare blocks. The original block
will be marked as ’bad’ and will no longer be addressable. The spare blocks are
a limited resource.
Hardware faults, device lifetime, custom configurations or usage patterns
contribute to the definition of the FSG.
3 Experiments and discussions
In order to provide a reliable support to our solution, we performed an extensive
experimental campaign, described in detail and discussed in the following.
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S.M.A.R.T.
3.1 Test-bed and settings
In this section we describe the environment for our experiments and the strategy
followed to obtain our results.
Our testbed includes the GNU/Linux OS Debian (version 6.0.6, code-name
squeeze) and the Ext4 file system implemented on the Linux Kernel (version
3.2.32 − 1). We choose this configuration due to its open-source nature and its
wide spread diffusion; indeed, the availability of the source code allowed a deeper
investigation on the causes of the randomness in the FSG.
Usually, the installation procedure requires a large amount of time, since it is
an interactive process and often it involves slow-access devices (e.g. CD-Rom
or DVD). In order to mitigate these aspects, we apply two strategy. On the
one hand, we exploit the preseed feature of the Debian installer; the preseeding
strategy simply provides a way to set answers to questions asked during the
installation process. In such way, there is no need for a user monitoring the
installation procedure since this task becomes fully automated. On the other
hand, in order to reduce the time required to complete the installation procedure,
we copied the entire Free Software distribution of Debian GNU/Linux on an USB
drive, and used it as a source media for the actual operating system installation.
The preseed feature requires the definition of a configuration file preseed.cfg
located in the root of the initrd (initial ramdisk). The answers written in this file
are read during the loading stage and they define the behaviour of the Debian
software. In such a way, we can define how the installer works in advance; in
details:
– Environment. The keymap, the language the country and the time zone are
set to US; the hardware provides an Ethernet card configured by the dhcp
server; the installer creates two users (root and guest)
– Disk settings. We do not use LVM or RAID technologies, but we required a
regular installation: we use the entire disk and create the swap and the root
partitions using the atomic mode in the preseed configuration where all files
are placed in single partition. Since it is the default setting for the installer,
we claim this parameters are the common ones used by the GNU/Linux
users.
– Post installation procedure. In addition, we have used the Post installation
procedure to gather all the data and the statistics needed for our study. In
particular, when each installation is completed, a script (named osfinger-
print.sh) is started. This script fetches and saves the data that will be used
in the subsequent data analysis. The post installation procedure collects the
list of the blocks locations used by each file of the file systems.Each reboot
triggers a new installation.
The post installation procedure gets the list of the blocks locations used by each
file of the file systems. These data have gathered through the tool debugfs, a
linux tool which can be used to examine and change the state of an ext2, ext3,
or ext4 file system. All the data collected after each installation are sent to a
remote repository.
All the experiments have been performed in the Computer Lab of the Com-
puter Science Department of the Sapienza University of Rome. This laboratory is
equipped with 28 workstations, having all the same hardware configuration: In-
tel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU @3.00GHz, 2GB of volatile memory (DDR 533Mhz)
and 81GB of Hard Disk. We stress the fact that all the workstations have the
same hardware configuration, being physically indistinguishable from each other.
Moreover, the installed CPU does not provide Hyper-Threading support. It is
important to recall that a multi-threaded environment may increase the non-
determinism increasing the diversity between the installations. In this context,
our testbed represents a worst case for our solution.
The experiments required about two weeks, and were carried out during the
Christmas holidays. We collected and analyzed about 12, 000 installations. We
claim this is a relevant data set providing a reliable support for the assessment
of the FSG . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first dataset harvested
from real operating system installations.
3.2 Installation corpus
In our experiments, we created two distinct dataset: i) the standard dataset, that
represents the installations with the basic packages; and, ii) the full dataset, that
represent the installations enriched with additional software. In particular, the
standard installation is composed by 26, 389 files whereas the full installation
contains 121, 587 files. Table 1 reports a high-level comparison between the full
and the standard installations.
Type Standard Full
Total Num. Files 26389 121587
Total Num. Blocks 164360 873861
Required Disk space 642 MB 3413 MB
Table 1. A high-level comparison between the full and the standard installations..
In details, the standard installation includes a desktop environment (Gnome
3) and common tools (e.g. a rich text editor like Libreoffice, graphics software,
shell script etc.). Further, the standard installation includes some server environ-
ment software, e.g. the web-server (the Apache2 developed by the Apache Soft-
ware Foundation), print-server (Cups systems), the DNS-Server (The ISC Bind
application), file-server (Samba), mail-server (Exim Internet Mailer, namely the
default choice of the Debian installer) and the SQL-database (Oracle MySQL
server).
In part of the experiments, we consider only the first block allocated for
a file. We claim that this aspect does not adversely affect our results since the
majority of the files of an operating system is stored in just few blocks as showed
in table 2.
Number of blocks Standard Full
[0 - 9] 91, 35% (24108) 90, 92% (110550)
[10 - 99] 7, 94% (2096) 8, 31% (10110)
[100 - 499] 0, 58% (154) 0, 63% (768)
[500 - 999] 0, 09% (24) 0, 07% (93)
[1000 - 1999] 0, 01% (3) 0, 028% (35)
[2000 - 3999] 0, 015% (4) 0, 017% (21)
more than 4000 0% (0) 0, 012% (7)
Table 2. Percentage of files composed by a certain number of blocks. Between the
brackets is reported the corresponding absolute value.
3.3 Evaluations
In order to introduce our full experiments, we have first studied the contribution
of three specific files to the characterization of the FSG.
Single file analysis and representation of the File System Genome
We performed a punctual analysis with the aim to explore how single files can
contribute to the diversity of the File System Genome.
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Fig. 2. The Cumulative Distribution Function (c.d.f.) for three files
We have chosen three specific files that are part of the standard installation
of Debian GNU/ Linux OS. The files considered occupies a single data block
and are written in the following order: File 1 before File 2 and File 2 before
File 3. Figure 2 shows the Cumulative Distribution Function (c.d.f.) related to
the three random processes after 6, 625 installations of these three specific files.
In the picture, the dotted line represents the uniform c.d.f, namely the ideal
distribution where the block allocator choose a different block with the same
probability in each installation. The other lines report the measured c.d.f. of the
considered files. This figure shows that the random process of File 1 appears
more predictable than the random process of File 3. Indeed, the random process
of File 1 does not appear to be uniform: a file block is stored with probability
one in the first 1, 500 locations. However, the c.d.f of File 2 and File 3 tend to
approximate the ideal uniform distribution represented by the dotted line. This
is due to the fact that the initial state of the installer procedure, is equal for all
the installations. As the installation proceeds, the entropy of the random process
gradually increases, getting close to the uniform distribution.
Fig. 3. An instance of File System Genome.
Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of a FSG of a specific Debian GNU/
Linux OS installation. In the figure, the x -axis lists the 120, 000 files that form
the operating system installation, while the y-axis indicates the location of the
first file block allocated for each file (the other file blocks are ignored in drawing
the figure for clarity). We colored each point with the color of the parent directory
to which the file belongs (in details, we consider only the /boot, /etc, /lib, /root,
/usr and /var parent directories). As can be seen from the colors in the figure,
the files in different parent directories tend to intermingle in the same areas of
the storage device.
Entropy and min-entropy The entropy and the min-entropy are largely used
in many fields of security and networking, as metrics to distinguish network
attacks or connection type [7,15]. In fact, entropy-based approaches are attrac-
tive since they provide more fine-grained insights than statistical traffic analysis
techniques. In our context, the entropy-based approaches capture fine-grained
patterns in the selection of the block locations.
The concept of Entropy was introduced by Shannon in [14]. The classic defi-
nition says that entropy is a measure of the uncertainty associated with a random
variable.
The entropy H(X) of a discrete random variable X is defined by the formula:
H(X) = −
∑
i
pi log2 pi
where pi = P [X = i] is the probability that X assumes the value i.
Min-entropy captures the amount of randomness that can be provided by a
given distribution. According with the definition in [13], we compute the min-
entropy with the following formula:
min entropy(X) = minx∈X log2
(
1
Pr[X = x]
)
In other words, the min-entropy of a distribution is equal to the probability of
the most likely element in X being drawn from X. As such, the min-entropy can
be considered as a lower bound for the Shannon entropy.
The min-entropy of File System Genome is computed by Algorithm 1. The
array I contains all the installations in our dataset; the array F contains the list
of files of the current installation. Lfi is the list of the block locations, (l
i
1, . . . , l
i
k),
used by file f in installation i. The matrix H contains partial results; the k-th
row stores the statistics of the file k for all the installations: each column j stores
the number of times that the block location j has been assigned to the file f . The
first part of the algorithm is devoted to the computation of the matrix H, then,
we compute the min-entropy for each file of the installation. It is important to
notice that the probability of choosing a location j of a file f is calculated by
dividing H[f ][j] by the number of performed installation, instead of the number
of block locations available in the disk. Indeed, the number of block locations in
an 80GB HDD is greater then the number of performed installations. Therefore,
we consider this estimation as a lower bound of the real value of the min-entropy.
Note that this analysis has been inspired by [16], where authors evaluate whether
an accelerometer sensor can be considered as source of randomness, and by [5],
where the author evidences how modern web browsers can be fingerprinted.
The entropy is estimated in a similar way; the only difference with respect
to Algorithm 1 is in the lines 11 up to 14 that are replaced by the entropy
estimation according to the previous formula.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show the entropy and min-entropy of the standard and
full installations respectively. The graphs represents the evaluation related to
6, 200 for each of the installations types. On the x -axis are reported the files
considered to evaluate entropy and min-entropy. Note that, the full installa-
tion contains more files rather than the standard one, i.e. the x -axes have well
distinct order of magnitude. As the graphs show, the operating system strives
to cluster the blocks of the file—that is, exploiting the space locality principle.
Nonetheless, as it can be noticed, the entropy and min-entropy values reach high
values, justifying the rational of our proposal. As such the results of the entropy
Input:
F : The array of file IDs
I: The array of samples to analyze
H: The FSG matrix; initialized to all 0
Output: The min-entropy associated to each file
1 ComputeMinEntropy(F ,I, H)
2 begin
3 foreach i ∈ I do
4 foreach f ∈ F do
5 Lfi = {li1, . . . , lik ∈ f}
6 foreach l ∈ Lfi do
7 H[f ][l]← H[f ][l] + 1
8 end
9 end
10 end
11 foreach f ∈ H do
12 v ← max(H[f ][j]), j = 1, . . . ,m
13 E[f ]← −log
(
v
|I|
)
14 end
15 return E
16 end
Algorithm 1: Evaluation of the min-entropy of each file created during the
installation procedure
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 14
 16
 18
 0  5000  10000  15000  20000  25000
Sorted File Entries (Standard)
Entropy Min-entropy
(a) Standard installation
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 14
 16
 18
 0  20000  40000  60000  80000  100000  120000
Sorted File Entries (Full)
Entropy Min-entropy
(b) Full Installation
Fig. 4. Entropy and min-entropy estimation for the genome of 6.200 installation.
measures highlight a significant amount of diversity in the collected corpus of in-
stallations and suggest that File System Genome can be considered a distinctive
and unique feature. Moreover, all the experiments have been performed using
the same components (in terms of hardware and software); we emphasize this
is the worst case, in fact, using distinct configuration (e.g. different HDD and
CPU as well as FS ) we can get even more profitable results.
4 Related work
The research area closest to the issues addressed in our paper appears to be
Forensic identification. It is worth describing some of these related results, even
though we stress that the approach we consider in this paper has not been
considered before.
Forensic identification is subject of many research and it is used in many ap-
plications. A well know forensic identification task involves the characterization
of printers. Despite the large use of digital communications, printed document
is still used in many criminal and malicious activities. Consider for examples
the forgery or alteration of national documents, e.g. an ID card. Printed mate-
rial may be also used as evidence of illicit activities, e.g. meeting notes, paper
correspondences, boarding passes or bank transactions, [10]. Hence, it may be
desirable to have the capability of identifying the manufacturer, model, or even
a specific device that was used to produce a paper document. In this context,
forensic characterization of printer papers involves finding features in the printed
document that are uniquely related to a specific printer. This printer signatures
directly emerge from printer mechanism as shown by many research, [1,2] and
others. Forensic identification of printers are manifold. A forensic technique used
for the identification of printer device exploits the print quality defect, namely
the banding in electro-photographic (EP). Results in literature, show that dif-
ferent printers expose different sets of banding frequencies that are related to
brand and model. In the same fashion, it is possible to extract printer signa-
tures by capturing the banding signal within the height of one text character.
A surprising result, [11], shows that the print quality defects, are considered as
texture in the printed regions of the document. The features can be extracted
from individual printed characters, in particular, the letter e in a document. In
this case, authors extract the signature using machine learning approaches.
Next, there exists many forensic identification technique for wired and wire-
less (RF) communication devices. In [6], authors propose a novel approach based
on the utilization of the signal characteristics of wired Ethernet card for use in
a security context. In fact, the ability of distinguish two NIC may be used as
communication filter able to prevent arp spoofing attacks and, in general, to
control the authenticity of either the source or the destination of a wired com-
munications. The signature of a wired network interface can be extracted from
the minute variations of the transient portion extracted by the produced signal.
This variations result from hardware and manufacturing inconsistencies,
Wireless devices can be identified using similar approaches. Software that
implements such forensic mechanisms can remotely identify the types of devices
located in a specific environment, realizing a layer 1 Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems. These techniques, [12], are usually implemented by the following steps: i)
a specially designed probe signal is sent in the wireless domain, ii) the response
signal is then captured and iii) exterminated in order to verify the identity of
the wireless device. In fact, the response signal contains unique distortion fea-
ture generated by the RF circuitry of the device in a nonlinearities fashion; these
distortions are used as fingerprint of the device.
5 Conclusions
This paper introduces File System Genome, a novel solution for the unique iden-
tification of HDDs. The File System Genome technique leverages the diversity
of the physical blocks locations used to store the files of an operating system.
To support our proposal, we justify our rationale, providing an insight of
the reasons that make two different installations of the same OS on the same
machine fundamentally different, when analyzed with the lens of our proposal.
Our findings are supported by an extensive experimental campaign: we carried
out some 12, 000 installations of the Debian GNU/Linux operating systems. All
the installations have been performed in a real testbed using the same hardware
(storage devices, motherboard, CPU, etc..). The resulting huge data set has been
analyzed resorting to sound information theory tools (entropy and min-entropy).
All the analyzed metrics show that the File System Genome is a distinctive and
unique feature of each individual HDD. Note that, given the rationales our solu-
tion is based upon, we expect that the File System Genome can be successfully
applied to other mass storage devices as well (e.g. SSDs, Flash memories).
As for future work, we plan to spend our efforts spent in two directions: the
use of the File System Genome as a building block for authentication protocols
based on challenge/response; and, the definition of the genomes of other species,
namely other file systems and operating systems.
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